Collapse and Reconstruction-3: Housing Policy in Kobe after the Hanshin Great Earthquake

Collapse and Reconstruction: Kobe <3>

Implementing Housing Recovery Policy

Temporary Housing Policy

The important programme at the beginning of the housing recovery was the provision of temporary housing units. There were, at the peak, 599 temporary shelters in schools, public buildings of various kinds and private facilities with 220 000 displaced victims. New temporary housing units were constructed in order to house those people.
Temporary housing is based on the Disaster Relief Act. This legislation requires self-help in the case of disaster. Temporary housing is to be limited to households unable to help themselves. The households eligible for temporary housing are those whose houses were completely burned, utterly collapsed or were washed away, those without houses and those unable to find houses with their own funds.
The prefectural and city governments did not carry out close scrutiny for qualification to move into temporary housing units. A means test was omitted. There are myriad of practical difficulties in coping with an extremely large-scale disaster using a residual programme. If a disaster victim tried to find a rental house, most of the inventory was also lost in the earthquake. And many households with their own land could not immediately reconstruct their houses. The governor of Hyogo Prefecture created a policy for all people in need of temporary housing and with a larger role than that described in the Disaster Relief Act but the system soon got into difficulties. The Disaster Relief Act was simply not designed to cover all the people who hoped to move into temporary houses.
Temporary housing promoted the grouping of victims and was clearly placed within the framework of the dualist model. Temporary housing was built more to dissolve temporary shelters. It was important to be staying in a temporary shelter to qualify for temporary housing. When most of the temporary shelters closed, the provision of temporary housing also closed down. It took some time to construct temporary housing, and during this period many victims gave up hope of moving into such housing. As a result, not all the people who had hoped to move into temporary housing could do so.
Many earthquake sufferers were considered part of the self-help group and regarded as not needing temporary housing. Some found alternative accommodation in which to live temporarily unaided. As time went by, those people dispersed, their situation became vague, and they became excluded from public programmes.
Temporary housing created a group of people in need of welfare, a high proportion of which were those with low incomes and the elderly. According to research on the conditions of temporary dwellers carried out by the Department of Welfare, the City of Kobe, in December 1995, the proportion of elderly people in temporary housing was high. Households with a single aged member (21 per cent), households consisting of two or more old persons only (10 per cent), and households with old person(s)(16%) - a total of 47 per cent. The Department of Housing Recovery, Hyogo Prefecture, also conducted research on temporary dwellers in February and March 1996. Some 42 per cent of households were with householders of 65 years old and older. Only 40 per cent of all households lived on a salary or were self-employed in a business, and 37 per cent lived on a pension. The percentage of households earning less than one million yen a year was 29 per cent, and the percentage with incomes less than 3 million yen was 70 per cent. The overwhelming majority of temporary housing residents were therefore those with low incomes and the elderly people.
Some 29 278 temporary units were constructed in Kobe and 3168 units outside of the city for Kobe citizens. However, there have been various problems: the location of the camps mostly in the outskirts of the city, low material quality, extremely small living space of 20-26 square meters, lack of medical and shopping facilities nearby, uniformly arranged, box-like structures in lines, inhumane environment and so on (Comerio, 1998; Habitat International Coalition, 1996). The standard of fundamental architectural efficiencies such as sound-proofing and thermal insulation is at an extremely low level. Differences in floor levels do not take the needs of elderly and the disabled people into consideration. The shortage of common space, green areas and living-related facilities is striking. Fifty-one per cent of temporary housing units built in the city were in Kita-ward and Nishi-ward in the suburbs, and 18 per cent on the artificial islands: Port-Island and Rokko-Island. Many camps were constructed in fenced parks and sites isolated from neighborhoods by main roads. These circumstances were thoroughly effective in causing the dwellers to become depressed. Many cases of lone deaths, suicides and accidental deaths have occurred. Alcoholism in middle-aged men and malnutrition of aged women are reportedly increasing.
The occupation rate of temporary housing has gradually decreased. It was, however, still 45 per cent as of April 1998, over 3 years after the earthquake. Approximately 14 000 households were still living in temporary housing. Since the mass-provision of public housing is still in progress, the decrease in the occupation rate will accelerate. It is, however, not likely that all the temporary housing will disappear in the near future.

Permanent Housing Policy

In July 1995, the City of Kobe made public the Kobe City Emergency Three-Year Plan for Housing Reconstruction as the basic framework for permanent housing policy. According to the plan, with 10 000 units, already started by and during the 1994 fiscal year and existing unoccupied housing, 72 000 units were to be newly started in the 1995-1997 fiscal years (see Table 5). Some 10 000 units or 14 per cent of the newly constructed housing units was planned as public housing for low-income households. The supply of 30 500 units or 42 per cent was planned as publicly subsidised housing of various types consisting of semi-public housing by the Housing and Urban Development Corporation (HUDC) and the Kobe City Housing Corporation for moderate-income households, redevelopment-related replacement housing mainly for low-income households and subsidised private rental housing for those with moderate incomes.
In July 1996, one year after the start of the Three-Year Plan, the Kobe Housing Restoration Plan was launched. It has three major points.
First, the projected number of housing units set in the Three-Year Plan was changed (see Table 5). Research on temporary housing by the city and prefectural governments disclosed the serious situation of low-income households and the aged. The projected number of public housing units was increased from 10 000 to 16 000 to meet the needs of the disadvantaged. The increase in public housing units was to be achieved by leasing private rental housing and housing built by HUDC. There was no change in the total number of public and subsidised housing combined: the increase in public housing was offset by the decrease in semi-public housing and subsidised private rental housing.
Second, the plan included projected targets for housing provision for low-income households. The projected number of 26 100 housing units included newly constructed public housing, public housing already under construction, leased housing, unoccupied existing housing, reconstructed earthquake-damaged public housing and redevelopment-related housing. It showed that the low-income housing policy had become more significant by the start of the new Housing Restoration Plan.
Third, the central government agreed to provide additional subsidy to reduce the rents of public housing. The amendment of the Public Housing Act in 1996 introduced a new rent system which set the rent according to the dweller's income and the condition of the housing unit. State subsidy was drawn exceptionally into public housing with the new rent system, and rent reduction was to be put into practice. The rent level was decided by the dweller's income, location of the housing and the size of the unit. The additional state subsidy was to continue for 5 years from the time of moving in.

Residualisation of Public Housing

How much has the housing recovery policy achieved? The tentative assessment of the progress the Three-Year Plan as of June 1998 showed that the number of new public and redevelopment-related housing units would reach the numerical goal, which meant that the programmes for those on low incomes would be fully achieved. The estimate for new semi-public and subsidised private rental housing was low. Overall, however, the total supply, including private housing production by market forces, has exceeded the number of units lost.
Whether the new housing provision really meets the needs of the victims is a different matter. Since many of the victims are elderly and/or low-income households, public housing provision has been significant. Public housing, however, is treated as residual housing and contributes only in a limited way.
At the time of the establishment of the Public Housing Act in 1951, most people were eligible to live in public housing. Policy was based on universalism. The income criterion covered the lowest 80 per cent of households in the country. The residualisation of public housing, however, began soon after the legislation and the range of people qualifying became increasingly more limited (Hirayama, 1990).
Various measures contributed to this residualisation. First, the income criterion was brought down. In the 1970s, it was covering only the lowest 33 per cent of all households. And since the latest amendment of 1996 it covers only the lowest 25 per cent. Second, action has been taken in relation to those whose incomes have increased since moving into public housing. The legislative amendment of 1959 established an obligation for those whose income exceeds the income criterion to make an effort to move out. The 1969 amendment made it possible for prefectural and local governments to request those with higher income to move out. Public housing is now systematically limited to low-income people. Third, the welfare categories have been expanded in the criteria for qualification to live in public housing. The special public housing provision limiting it to the aged, the disabled and households with single parents has been increased. The welfare categories are related to the 'worthy poor'. In a society where self-reliance is considered the principle, welfare housing always requires justification. It is difficult to be recognised as the worthy poor simply by being a low-income household. The use of welfare categories implies a means of procuring an agreement for the justification of public housing. After the amendment of 1996, the income criterion can be relaxed up to the lowest 40 per cent but only for aged households, and at the discretion of prefectural and local governments. It is now intended to accelerate the introduction of welfare categories into public housing.
Until the 1960s, public housing was intended to function as an aid for younger households. Though tenants were on low incomes, they were expected to be able to access the self-help society when their income increased with age. Younger households were supposed to live temporarily in public housing for a limited period before the acquisition of their own houses. Since the 1970s, however, public housing has formed a separate society apart from the mainstream rather than a route into it. Public housing was transformed into a domain where low-income and/or elderly households live long term. The 1996 amendment of the law has completed this residualisation by lowering the income criterion and expanding welfare categories. Public housing residualisation is a policy employed in many developed nations (Harloe, 1995, etc.). In the UK, a policy to dispose of public housing by sale was undertaken under the Thatcher administration (Forrest & Murie, 1988), and in the USA, public housing construction was almost entirely stopped under the Reagan administration (Hays, 1995). These examples have often been referred to in Japan and have influenced the changes in public housing policy.
The qualification for public housing in the earthquake-hit area basically follows the usual system. The income criteria for public housing were abolished but as an exceptional measure by the Urban Disaster Area Reconstruction Special Act. However, the usual criteria have been adopted, because the abolition of the criteria could have caused a huge demand for public housing. With reference to the welfare categories, 30 per cent of new public housing units after the event were set aside especially for the elderly, the disabled, single-parent households and so on, as priority housing.
At the same time, there has been a growing tendency to select temporary housing residents for public housing. The victims in temporary shelters were given priority to move into temporary housing units. The relationship between temporary shelter and temporary housing was taken over by the relationship between temporary housing and public housing. There was no priority housing for temporary housing residents as of October 1995 when application for public housing began, shortly after the completion of temporary housing construction. The relationship between temporary housing and public housing had not yet been defined. In July 1996, 60 per cent of new public housing units were set aside for temporary housing residents. If a temporary dweller could not draw a winning number in the lottery for the '60 per cent', he/she could reapply for the '40 per cent' for general victims. In April 1998, the proportion of priority housing for temporary housing residents was expanded further to 80 per cent. The qualification for public housing has been strictly narrowed by a combination of income criteria, welfare categories and priority for temporary dwellers.
Public housing developments which require large sites have been concentrated on the outskirts. Because of the urgent need for replacement housing, many public housing projects were designed as large-scale developments with high-rise towers. According to the estimate of the Housing Restoration Plan as of March 1998, 25 905 low-income units were to be provided. This figure is close to the target of 26 100 units. However, when we look at the coverage rate of low-income housing units projected to the units lost, it is less than 30 per cent in urban wards including Higashi-Nada-ward, Nada-ward, Nagata-ward and Suma-ward, whereas it is more than 200 per cent in Kita-ward and Nishi-ward in suburbs (see Table 6). The location of public housing is thus extremely unequal. Although public housing supply is needed particularly in inner-city areas like Nagata-ward, where the damage was extensive and where many low-income people lived the new public housing developments were concentrated in outlying areas and low-income people, the elderly and households on welfare gathered there, resulting in growing socio-spatial segregation.

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